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 REFORM OF INCOME-TAX AND ESTATE-DUTY.
 THE income-tax is our sheet-anchor of national finance.
 Already it occupies so dominant a part that we cannot even
 imagine ourselves without it; as it has been our help in the years
 that are past, so it must be our hope for the future. We cannot
 get away from it if we would; more than a century ago it was
 tried, tentatively and temporarily, as an instrument of finance;
 reimposed after an interval, it has proved sound and reliable,
 so that now it provides nearly one quarter of our total national
 revenue. And it will supply a greater proportion in the future.
 But in its application we are still in the experimental stages;
 we have no system, properly so called. By our empirical methods,
 indeed, we are seeking approximation to a just and fair distribu-
 tion of taxation between rich and poor; and such efforts have
 not been fruitless. We recognise that the more slender incomes
 must be treated with special tenderness, and to them "abate-
 ment " is given; we perceive that the fat and substantial incomes
 should afford a higher contribution, and to them we apply a
 "supertax "; we make a difference between incomes which are
 the fruit of the owner's work, and those which depend on the
 fructification of capital without personal labour; and in all these
 ways we feel that we are dealing justly, if very clumsily, with
 rich and poor. This is all to the good; but the methods are
 those of experiment, not those of settled policy. Up to the
 present, indeed, this has been inevitable; but now it is high time
 to emerge from empiricism to system; to reduce these various
 contrivances, as far as possible, into a single system of universal
 application, whereby each man shall be automatically charged
 in proportion to his ability.
 Not that any practical method should be condemned for lack
 of theoretic consistency, so long as it works well; but if it appears
 that our present scheme is not only theoretically unsound, but
 is also difficult, inelastic, and cumbersome in its practical work-
 ing, then there must be an overwhelminig case for reform.
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 L Let us first rid ourselves of any misconceptions. Neither the
 present Finance Minister nor any of his predecessors can be
 reasonably blamed for the imperfections of our present income-
 tax. They have only followed the advice of the Select Committee
 on income-tax of 1906. Do we then throw the blame back on
 to the Committee? Certainly not. On the contrary, I believe it
 impossible for anyone fully to grasp the difficulty of the problem
 who has not studied this Committee's blue-book; the information
 in it is extensive, and the recommendations are well considered.
 The report is a great gain, a clear step in advance, a starting-
 point for reform. Its main recommendations must not be over-
 looked. It suggests extension of the abatement principle to
 incomes of ?1,000; it warns us that we must in any case retain
 taxation at source; it suggests additional taxation of persons
 whose income exceeds ?5,000; it recommends differentiation
 between earned and unearned incomes; and lastly it distinctly
 approves compulsory declaration from each individual of total
 net income in respect of which tax is payable. These recom-
 mendations must be kept before our minds constantly, while
 we consider any scheme of practical reform.
 Turning now to the partial application of these recommenda-
 tions, as presented in the budgets of 1909 and 1910, what do we
 find? We find a graduated arrangement which is, broadly speak-
 ing, just; though in detail injustice is inflicted owing to the
 coarseness of the graduation. Its weakness, however, appears
 when we examine it in detail. A "normal tax " of 9d. is imposed
 on earned incomes, with abatement under ?700; Is. on incomes
 between.?2,000 and ?3,000; ls. 2d. between ?3,000 and ?5,000;
 a supertax on incomes over ?5,000; and all unearned incomes
 taxed at is. 2d. Now, whatever can be said for this scheme, it
 is horribly cumbersome; and we may well ask what will happen
 when the Chancellor wishes to raise his demands on the tax-
 payers. He will certainly be in difficulties. Each item of all
 these will have to be increased; the proportions must inevitably
 be altered; the result will be confusion and discontent. In view
 of such conditions, we can hardly say that our present scheme
 works, or is likely to work, smoothly. A change of rate is no
 longer simple, as it used to be, but highly complex; it is neither
 easily controlled by the Chancellor, nor easily understanded of
 the people; in plain terms, the utility and elasticity of our
 income-tax is seriously menaced by its lack of system.
 But if we are to adopt a system, it must be in conformity with
 practical requirements; it must not neglect the advice of those
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 who have studied the subject; and it must be such as will fulfil
 and systematise, rather than relinquish and abrogate, the general
 trend of our former experiments.
 Now the simplest form of income-tax is the imposition of a
 fixed or flat rate on all incomes, irrespective of size. To this
 form there are two objections. First, there is already in force
 a scheme of indirect taxation on some necessaries, or virtual
 necessaries, of life, such as sugar, tea, and perhaps tobacco; these
 taxes fall with increasing severity on the lower grades of income;
 we therefore require a system which shall grant exemption to
 all incomes below such a figure as admits of decent living under
 existing circumstances of indirect taxation. Secondly, apart
 from indirect taxation, it is generally admitted that a person in
 receipt of ?1,000 a year is better able to afford ?50 of tax than
 is the holder of ?500 to afford ?25; the possessor of ?10,000 is
 less inconvenienced by the loss of ?500 than either. As this
 principle has been for long applied to incomes below ?700, so it
 ought to be applicable to all incomes above that figure; this is,
 indeed, the principle which underlies the present supertax. For
 these reasons, then, we find the principle of the flat rate faulty
 and inconclusive.
 But so soon as we depart from the flat rate, which provides
 us with a simple standard, we seem to land ourselves in difficulty.
 We get off the straight road, as it were, and are obliged to strike
 off in a direction where there is no beaten track. We are, in
 fact, in the empirical region, and can only correct our experi-
 mental direction by subsequent observations. One thing, how-
 ever, is clear; namely, that incomes of moderate dimensions
 must be taxed at something like the present normal tax; while
 small incomes must be charged at less than this rate; great
 incomes, on the other hand, must be charged at higher rates,
 but not so much higher as to involve predatory taxation even
 for the highest. This means that the charges must rise fairly
 sharply from about ?100 to ?1,000, and after that any further
 rise must be exceedingly gradual, as we approach the very large
 incomes. In any case, incomes of different sizes must be charged
 at different rates all the way up the scale.
 Now, if persons are to be charged at different rates according
 to the size of their incomes, then it is necessary to obtain from
 all persons a statement of their total income from all sources,
 in order to ascertain the proportion in which they are to be taxed.
 This is a necessary condition of any attempt to deal with the
 problem; as has been acknowledged by the Select Committee,
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 and partially exemplified by the working of the present supertax.
 Nor is universal declaration a matter of serious difficulty. Already
 about three-quarters of all income-tax payers make statements
 of their incomes in order to obtain abatement; it is not a great
 hardship that the remaining quarter should do the same. But,
 seeing that those remaining persons have to declare with a
 prospect of loss instead of gain, it is of the utmost importance
 that their treatment should be one of strict relative justice;
 for injustice will induce under-statement.
 Granting, then, a general declaration of income, what method
 of apportionment can we adopt? How can we grade the charges
 satisfactorily? Many attempts have been made to devise satis-
 factory schemes of graduation; some have few and steep steps,
 some many and gentle; some propose only slight additions for the
 higher incomes, others so great as to have the effect of confisca-
 tion. But whatever their merits or demerits, they all fall under
 the same condemnation-that they are arbitrary. By this I mean
 that the increase of taxation proposed for the higher incomes
 is governed largely by the personal bias or predilection of the
 proposer, and not by systematic co-ordination with the scheme
 of rates imposed on the lower grades of income. Several pro-
 posals of this arbitrary order may be found in the report of the
 Select Committee. (See pp. 69, 112, 238, 260.) Each of these
 schemes may or may not be reasonable; it is not on the ground
 of unreasonableness that we find fault with any or all of them;
 the fault is that all alike are arbitrary. A method of taxation
 which is arbitrarily imposed can be altered arbitrarily, and must
 engender a sense of insecurity and instability. This is the first
 and greatest fault of graduations in general; the second is, that
 if graduations are few and steep, some advantage is gained in
 simplicity of administration at the expense of relative justice;
 if they are many and gentle, the advantages of justice are over-
 borne by complexities of administration. Neither is there any
 method of step-graduation which fails to inflict some injustice;
 for instance, under the 1910 Budget, an income immediately
 over ?5,000 a year pays ?50 more tax than one immediately
 below that sum. Now it may be said, possibly with truth, that no
 method of taxation is perfectly just; but obvious and crude in-
 justice, in addition to standing condemned in itself, has the dis-
 advantage that it stimulates evasion. Evasion, in fact, always
 results where steep graduation is employed, whether for the
 purpose of income-tax or death-duties.
 To fulfil our requirements, we need some sort of a curve, of
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 known formula, as simple as possible, which shall regulate tax
 incidence automatically. In doing so, however, we are clearly
 limited in the application of such a curve, by the necessity of
 retaining, with little if any modification, the method of "collec-
 tion at source." When this method was first applied, a century
 ago, its immediate result was to double the yield of the tax.
 Such a method cannot be abandoned; experience has abundantly
 proved it to combine the virtues of simplicity and fruitfulness.
 It gives the machinery by which the doctrine of differentiation
 is brought into play. Retention of this method means that un-
 earned income must be charged at source with a uniform rate
 for all incomes; moreover, it is very undesirable that the State
 should disgorge more of this money than it must disgorge in order
 to avoid inflicting hardship. It is hoped to show that such source-
 collection can be satisfactorily combined with our new proposals.
 For the moment, however, let us imagine that all incomes are
 "earned," and so ease ourselves temporarily of the problem of
 differentiation.
 The system here propounded is that of logarithmic proportion;
 and the curve of rates suggested is the common logarithmic curve.
 For its application, we require only the settlement of two units;
 one of these we may call the income-unit, the other the tax-unit.
 Let us take, for example, an income-unit of ?100, and a tax-unit
 of Is. Then the owner of ?100 a year has one income-unit,
 and is charged log. 1 of the tax, i.e., nil. The owner of ?1,000
 has ten units, and is charged (since log. 10=1) ls. in the ?.
 Similarly the owner of ?10,000 is charged (since log. 100 = 2)
 twice the tax-unit, or 2s. in the ?, ?100,000 is charged 3s., and
 so on for the very few incomes (perhaps 100) higher than this
 enormous sum. Each intermediate figure will have its corre-
 sponding logarithm. The system, then, stated in general terms,
 is: The proportion of tax-unit to be paid on any income, will
 be the logarithm of the number of tax-units which it contains.
 Such is the proposal. It is based on an approximation to what
 we may call "the law of proportional sacrifice." It is claimed
 that this would prove a fair measure of the relative ability of
 citizens of all ranks to meet the requirements of public service.
 The assumption which is made on this system is that, if a man
 with ?1,000 a year is called upon to part with ?50 of it for the
 public service, then a man with ?10,000 might reasonably be
 asked to contribute, not ?500, but ?1,000, and the possessor of
 ?100,000 a year, not ?5,000 but ?15,000. It is believed that
 these various owners would feel the loss of such sums equally,
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 although the proportional loss is unequal. This is, indeed, an
 assumption; but it is an assumption closely in accord with, and
 illustrated by, the present incidence of tax-rate; and be it
 remembered, the scale now in force is the outcome, not of a
 sudden caprice of any one man or government, but of a steady
 growth of public opinion, concerning which political parties are
 in practical agreement. Now it so happens, under our present
 scheme, that the owner of ?10,000 a year is taxed rather more
 than twice as much in proportion to. his income as the owner
 of ?1,000, this being the practical result of his bearing a tax of
 1s. 2d. (instead of 9d.), with a 6d. super-tax on all except ?3,000.
 As far, therefore, as concerns incomes between these ranges, our
 assumption seems justified by the broad facts of present taxation.
 Annexed will be found a graphic representation of the
 proposed system of rates, on which is superposed the present
 scheme of rates. This is constructed on the basis of an income-
 unit of ?100, and in such a way that the "tax-unit" is of the
 same amount (at present 9d.) as the "normal tax"; the curve
 shown is one continuous curve, telescoped successively for con-
 venience of space. The first portion passes by hundreds from
 ?100 to ?1,000; the second by thousands from ?1,000 to ?10,000;
 the third by tens of thousands up to ?100,000. The single curve
 is thus telescoped twice in succession into one-tenth of its
 previous dimensions. The same remarks, later on, will be
 found applicable to the curve of death-duties. Looking, then,
 at the second group, in the income-tax graph, we see the corre-
 spondence between the present and the proposed rates to be so
 close as to require no comment. (?1,000 to ?10,000.) Similarly,
 the first group of the same curve shows the extent of harmony
 between the two schemes for incomes ranging from ?100 to
 ?1,000. Here also the close correspondence is remarkable; but
 the importance of this group is so great, that this portion of the
 scheme calls for special comment. We note then that on this
 system ?700 cannot be charged at the same rate as ?1,000; hence
 some slight remission at and about ?700. Only when we approach
 the lower end of the scale do we find subject-matter for con-
 troversy. This is occasioned by the substitution of an exempt
 income-unit of ?100 for an exempt limit of ?160. By the new
 system, therefore, incomes between ?100 and ?160 are called
 on for small contributions. Whether it be desirable to lower the
 exemption figure to ?100 must be an open question; if so be that
 the lowering of the figure were not considered practicable, then
 it would be simple to continue the present scheme of abatement
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 for incomes below ?400-the first point where the two curves
 meet. Let us now compare the total amount of tax levied on
 incomes from ?100 to ?1,000, by the present tax of 9d., and
 under the proposed scheme with a 9d. tax-unit
 Amount by
 Income. Old Scheme. New System.
 ? ? s. d, ? s. d.
 120 nil 0 7 2
 140 nil 0 15 4
 160 nil 1 4 0
 180 0 15 0 1 14 6
 200 1 10 0 2 5 2
 250 3 7 6 3 14 6
 300 5 5 0 5 7 4
 350 7 2 6 7 2 10
 400 9 0 0 9 0 6
 500 13 5 0 13 2 1
 600 18 0 0 17 10 2
 700 23 15 0 22 3 8
 800 30 0 0 27 1 10
 900 33 15 0 32 4 2
 1,000 37 10 0 37 10 0
 If the lowering of the exemption figure were not considered
 possible, then for incomes below ?400 we could retain the older
 method. Reasons for the lowering of the exemption figure to
 ?100, and for the adoption of the ?100 income-unit are given in
 a footnote.'
 1 The writer had himself contemplated and worked out a system on the basis of
 a ?160 income-unit; it is, of course, possible, but in view of its practical difficulties
 it was abandoned in favour of the ?100 unit. The main objections are two in
 number: first, it involves an additional step in calculation. In the case of the ?100
 unit, the number of income-units is known by inspection, while the ?160 require
 calculation. Simplicity in these matters counts for much. Secondly--and this is
 of more weight-the full tax-unit would, in case of the ?160 income-unit, not be
 exigible below the figure of ?1,600; in order therefore to produce the same yield
 from an income, say of ?1,000, the denomination of the tax-unit would have to be
 raised by about one-third; e.g., the 9d. tax-unit on the ?100 basis would be
 equivalent in yield to a ls. tax-unit on the ?160 basis. The ?100 unit would involve
 no change in the present denomination of " normal " tax, while the ?160 unit would
 raise it; people would fail to realise that the raised denomination did not mean
 a raised tax; the resulting unpopularity would react on the Chancellor; thus
 a good scheme would be in danger of shipwreck owing to a fault of detail.
 If we assume that the ?160 exemption limit must be maintained, it would be far
 better to do so by the modification of the lower end of the curve, as above suggested,
 than by the raising of the income-unit; this could be readily effected by simply
 abating ?160 on all incomes below ?400 and charging the full tax-unit on the
 remainder.
 The writer himself would approve of the ?100 exemption limit, and that for two
 chief reasons:-
 1. ?100 is an income which in fact under present conditions of indirect taxation
 makes decent living practicable. Under this system ?100 is exempt, and the tax
 rises very gradually up to about ?1 on an income of ?150.
 2. The number of electors with incomes between ?100 and ?160 is very great;
 these electors largely determine the taxes to be imposed on the more well-to-do, and
 it is an ugly thing that taxes, largely in the interests of the poor, should be imposed
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 Having now dealt with the first two groups of our curve, we
 pass on to the third, which affects incomes of above ?10,000.
 Here it will be seen that the new curve rises above the old rates,
 while the old rates become practically level after ?20,000. The
 incomes here referred to are very large, and their taxation by the
 new method, at least up to ?100,000, does not seem excessive.1
 An income, for instance, of ?100,000 is charged at 3 times the
 tax-unit, instead of 2 2 times, as before.
 Such, then, is a brief review of the rate-incidence under the
 proposed logarithmic plan.
 It may be suggested that the excellent correspondence of the
 proposed rate-incidence with that now in force, is dependent on
 the choice of an income-unit of ?100; that an income-unit of
 ?80 or of ?160 would alter widely the whole aspect of affairs.
 by the poor on the rich, themselves bearing no portion of the burden. As the
 Income Tax looms larger in our scheme of national revenue, so will this state
 of affairs become more dangerous. " In no other European country," says the
 Spectator (May 28th, 1910, p. 869) " are the mass of electors so completely exempted
 from (direct) taxation as in the United Kingdom. In Prussia the Income Tax
 is levied on all incomes above ?45 a year; in some other states of Germany, the
 limit is as low as ?20 a year, and in some Swiss cantons there is no lower limit at
 all. . . . The moral effect of bringing home to every elector the fact that he has
 himself to pay taxes is worth a very great deal of administrative expenditure."
 Again (January 28th, 1911, p. 138) " The political tune in this country is no longer
 called by the tax-payer but by the tax-eater . . . persons who pay no direct taxation
 and many of whom are under the impression that they pay no taxes at all. That,
 of course, is the Constitutional vice of indirect taxation." And in view of the
 probable reduction or abolition of the sugar and tea duties, the writer adds: " In
 that event it will be roughly true that the majority of the electors of the kingdom
 will be subject to no compulsory tax at all. Yet on their votes will finally depend
 the determination of the expenditure of public money. Few people appear yet to
 have recognised the full gravity of this situation." The truth which underlies such
 statements points clearly to the lowering of the exemption limit; and such a lowering
 would, the writer thinks, cause little difficulty in the country, if presented as an
 integral part of a large system by which the poor shall be taxed according to his
 poverty, and the rich according to his wealth. Reference to the graph will clear
 the writer of any imputation of partiality towards the rich, and he desires to
 emphasise the lightness of the burden which would fall on incomes between ?100
 and ?160.
 1 The writer does not wish to seem lightly to pass over the heavy taxation which
 would thus fall on the few possessors of very large incomes. An income, for
 instance, of ?1,000,000 would pay four times the tax-unit. Taxation above a
 certain limit-I do not know where that limit comes-would tend to produce
 a " Flight of Capital "; it is true enough that fixed or (so to speak) old capital
 cannot be removed from the country; but fluid or young capital can, and in the
 last resort can be followed by its owner. If, then, the above figure should seem to
 be too high, it may be necessary to set an upper limit to our curve, and to tax at
 the same rate all incomes above (say) ?20,000. This may or may not be necessary,
 but as far as the exchequer is concerned the difference would not be very significant,
 since the difference in rate rises but very slowly and the number of incomes above
 ?20,000 is small. The writer is inclined to think that no upper limit need be set,
 but it is possible that with fuller knowledge this opinion would be changed.
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 In fact, however, this is not so. It is true that on other grounds
 the writer would advocate strongly the adoption of the ?100
 income-unit-grounds of practical and political expediency-but
 the adoption of some other income-unit would actually have a
 very small effect on the direction of the curve, allowing for the
 same yield to the Exchequer.
 We see how, then, the new scheme marches in close harmony
 with the old, the new curve being crossed and recrossed by the
 " steps " of the present scheme, till the two meet at about ?12,000;
 after this point, the proposed system would very gradually rise
 to a higher figure than by the old method. In practical effect, if
 the scheme were adopted without modification, the owner of
 ?100,000 a year would, at the 9d. tax-unit, be taxed 2s. 3d. in
 the ?, and the owner of ?1,000,000 a year, 3s. in the ?. But
 if this system should seem to tax the rich to a high degree, it
 also gives them security that no arbitrary taxation shall be applied
 to their incomes; for, by this method, incomes of great size
 cannot be taxed without incomes of all grades bearing their
 due proportion.
 Furthermore, a balance of economic advantage is struck. It
 is economically disadvantageous that wealth should be distributed
 in a State with glaring disparity; therefore, the State, while
 permitting such disparity, is justified in exacting from the holders
 of great wealth a large insurance fee (if we may so call it) for
 security of tenure. Nor could it be suggested that such a system
 is moving in the direction of confiscation; rather would it tend
 to prevent arbitrary depredation, giving both security to the
 income-holder and revenue to the State, thus securing, so to
 speak, both seed to the sower and bread to the eater.
 We have hitherto dealt with the proposed system theoretically;
 let us now proceed to practical considerations. For the applica-
 tion of these principles, it is only necessary that each taxpayer
 should receive with his schedule a table showing the total tax
 to which various incomes are liable; about 75 incomes of
 different sizes would be tabulated, in the manner exemplified
 below; I from this he will see at a glance the amount of his tax,
 1 Specimens from table showing total tax exigible from owners of different
 incomes:-
 Total tax in ? and decimals at tax-unit of
 Income. Units. Log. do. 9d. lOd. lld. 12d. 13d. 14d. 15d.
 ? ?
 250 2-5 0-898 3-73 4-15 4-56 4*97 5-39 5-80 6-22
 750 7-5 0-875 24-61 27-35 30-08 32-81 35-55 38-28 41-02
 2,250 22-5 1-352 114-09 126-77 139-44 152-12 164-8 177-47 190-15
 6,500 65-0 1-813 441-9 490-95 54041 589-2 638-3 687-4 736-5
 13,000 130-0 2-114 1,030-6 1145-1 1259-6 1374-1 1488-6 1603-1 1717-6
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 whatever the current tax-unit may be; if his income lies between
 any two points there tabulated, he can easily calculate his total
 tax by simple interpolation, without any use of logarithms. Such
 a calculation will not differ by more than a shilling or two in the
 large incomes, or in the case of the more modest incomes by a few
 pence, from the true tax calculated direct by logarithm; since
 between any two consecutive points on the curve of rates the
 curve is very nearly a straight line. The difference is negligible;
 a small benefit to this amount will accrue to the taxpayer if
 he calculates by the true method. But in case it should be
 gathered from these remarks that the logarithmic method is
 tedious or slow, it may be mentioned that the writer has himself
 tabulated over 500 income-tax totals in about four hours.
 Thus it is proposed to sweep away the fiction of a uniform
 rate, and to substitute for it a table of charges on various incomes
 according to a fixed principle. The coherence and simplicity
 of the new method are in sharp contrast to the multiplicity and
 complexity of the old.
 As to yield to the Exchequer. A table has been prepared,
 giving an estimate of the yield, as compared with the yield of
 the present rates. This table is -based upon Mr. Chiozza Money's
 estimate of the number of incomes of various sizes, as given in
 the Select Committee's report (Blue-book, p. 64). As it was
 desired to ascend by thousands from ?1,000 to ?10,000, the figures
 were subdivided in approximation to the proportions found in
 Mr. Bowley's calculalions (p. 228). The table, thus arranged,
 gives an estimate of the yield according to the Budget of
 1909-1910, with a "normal tax" of 9d., and the yield of the
 same number of incomes on the proposed system, using a "tax-
 unit" of 9d. Returns are not given of incomes between ?100
 and ?160, as no numbers are available. A second estimate is
 given for the new system, on the supposition that (1) abatement
 of ?160 were adhered to in respect of incomes below ?400, and
 (2) that all incomes above ?20,000 were charged at the same
 rate. Even under these circumstances there is a slight balance
 in favour of the proposed method; incidentally also, the
 Exchequer will gain, inasmuch as the stimulus to evasion, which
 at present operates, will no longer exist.
This content downloaded from 129.219.247.33 on Mon, 27 Jun 2016 09:15:29 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 382 THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL [SEPT
 INCOME-TAX: COMPARATIVE YIELDS.
 Estimate of revenue (1) under the Budget of 1909-10, compared with (2) the
 roposed system of logarithmic proportion, both with and without modification:-
 No. of Average Old Scheme.
 Persons. income. Yield. New Unmodified. New Modified.
 Thousands. ? ? ? ?
 214 180 160,500 369,150 160,500
 270 250 911,250 1,005,750 911,250
 126 350 897,750 899,766 897,750
 80 450 1,095,000 1,048,480 1,048,480
 65 550 1,060,312 992,550 992,550
 55 650 1,206,550 1,089,825 1,089,825
 45 750 1,236,375 1,107,495 1,107,495
 35 850 1,115,625 1,036,875 1,036,875
 25 950 890,625 870,775 870,775
 86 1,500 4,837,500 5,689,330 5,689,330
 25 5 2,500 3,187,500 3,341,954 3,341,954
 12 3,500 2,450,000 2,431,908 2,431,908
 7 4,500 1,837,500 1,952,860 1,952,860
 3 5 5,500 1,341,666 1,256,325 1,256,325
 2 4 6,500 1,120,000 1,060,555 1,060,555
 1 6 7,500 880,000 843,777 843,777
 1 2 8,500 760,000 738,002 738,002
 0 8 9,500 573,330 563,651 563,651
 2 5 15,000 2,937,500 3,060,128 3,060,128
 1.5 35,000 4,375,000 5,008,634 4,530,153
 0 25 75,000 1,543,750 2,021,527 1,617,912
 Totals ?34,417,733 ?36,389,317 ?35,202,055
 These totals do not take into account the higher charges on unearned income,
 which in each case would produce large additional revenue. The data as to the
 number of incomes of various sizes are only approximate; our object, however, is to
 compare the yield of the two methods, not to give the absolute figures. With the
 increase of population, the number of taxpayers has probably advanced in the last
 ten years about 10 per cent., so that the figures above are probably an under.
 estimate at the present time.
 A 9d. tax-unit, then, will mean the same thing, both to the
 taxpayer and to the Chancellor, as the present "normal" tax
 of 9d., together with its paraphernalia of increased taxes, and
 supertax. Under the new system, however, if more money were
 required, the Chancellor would only have to raise the tax-unit,
 and everything else would work automatically; the yield of each
 penny would be ?4,000,000.
 Now we pass to the consideration of the question of the
 treatment of unearned income under the proposed system. It
 is of great importance, as it involves a large amount of additional
 revenue.
 Practical considerations demand that a fixed rate should be
 charged at source on all unearned income; and here it appears
 that practical considerations must weigh against all others. How
 then can these two methods be combined? Fortunately, it does
 not appear to be difficult. At present we may say that unearned
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 income is charged half as much again as earned income. This
 does, indeed, seem an excessive disproportion, but we must argue
 on the basis of present taxation. The plan then is, that each man
 should declare his total income from all sources; then for the
 earned portion he will be taxed at the rate indicated on the table,
 or graph, corresponding to his total income; while for the un-
 earned portion, the full "unearned " rate will be deducted at
 source. In order to give remission to incomes of small amount,
 a linear digression might be introduced, starting from ?500, and
 reaching zero at ?100.1 But the total of a man's income will
 decide the rate of his tax on earned income in all cases. To give
 an example; take a person whose total income is ?800, ?500
 earned, and ?300 unearned; he is then taxed at source on ?300
 at the rate current for unearned income, while on ?500 he is
 charged at that rate on the logarithmic curve which obtains for
 a total income of ?800; the amount of tax for this ?500 will be I of
 the amount given in the table for ?800. Those persons whose total
 income-rate is higher than the "unearned " rate-i.e., whose
 income exceeds ?3,300-will pay the tax for their total income, as
 represented on the curve, simply deducting the amount which has
 been collected at source.
 Enough has now been said to indicate the lines along which
 the system proposed could be combined with the levy of a fixed
 rate on unearned incomes. The reason for adhering to a fixed
 rate for unearned income is not logic but necessity. The flat rate on
 unearned income cannot be abolished, unless we are prepared
 either to do away with collection at source, or to institute a
 costly and laborious process of repayment to taxpayers of part
 of what they have already paid at source. Neither of these courses
 appears at present to be practicable. It is not, however, imprac-
 ticable to combine the two methods of taxation in the manner
 above indicated.
 To gather up, then, the main points of what has been said:
 the system of taxing incomes in logarithmic proportion, with an
 income-unit of ?100, and a tax-unit varying with requirements,
 would introduce order into our present disorderly scheme; it would
 tax incomes, broadly speaking, in a similar proportion to that now in
 force, but without the incentives to evasion which the present steps
 supply. If the system should be thought to act too harshly towards
 l This linear digression is the merest suggestion. It would mean that the owner
 of an income of less than ?500 in all would be entitled to a rebate; of the tax
 already paid at source, he would recover the fraction 500__, where x is the total
 400
 income in pounds.
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 the very lowest or the very highest grades of income (a point which
 is open to question), these difficulties can be readily overcome.
 The total return to the Exchequer would be the same or slightly
 greater than at present, using the same figure of tax-unit as
 the present normal tax. The system could be readily understood
 by the circulation of suitable tables, with the schedules, whereby
 each man would see at once the amount of his tax. A permanent
 proportion would be established between the taxation of rich
 and poor, to the great advantage of both. Not least, because
 last, the Finance Ministers of the future would bless a system
 which only left them to settle what should be the tax-unit for
 the year; knowing that every penny added would mean an ad-
 ditional revenue of ?4,000,000.
 ESTATE-DUTY.
 If we have need of system in the matter of income-tax, we
 have no less need of it in the matter of estate-duty. And if the
 system here propounded is applicable to the complex subject of
 income-tax, it is a fortiori applicable to the less complex but no
 less important subject of estate-duties. The two subjects are
 closely allied; for, in its inception, estate-duty was regarded as
 a form of deferred income-tax, on the assumption that the
 income-holder had not, under the older system of income-
 tax, paid a high enough proportion of his income during
 life. If this hypothesis be maintained, then, under a new
 and juster system of income-tax, there is no case at all
 for estate-duties. But, in truth, we can no longer pretend
 that in estate-duty the deceased person is paying additionaal dues
 to the State, before the heirs enter upon their inheritance; we
 must plainly say that the heir is obliged to pay such and such
 a proportion of his inherited wealth to the State for his security
 of inheritance; we must, in short, admit a complete theoretic
 independence between income-tax and estate-duty. Neverthe-
 less, since both forms of tax directly affect the same properties,
 the principle of taxation should be the same in each case. In the
 application of such a principle, however, we must bear in mind
 the distinction between income and capital. The distinction is
 not, of course, absolute, either in the individual or the national
 sense; but neither is it without serious significance; it is at the
 least certain that the annual inroad of the Chancellor of the
 Exchequer upon the national capital should not be allowed to
 rise above a certain limit. The fixation of this limit is difficult;
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 but in practice it could be effected by adopting a settled system
 of estate-duties on a sound basis, to extend over a large number
 of years. The iniquity of varying the amount of estate-duties
 every two or three years is apparent. This form of tax obtains
 circulation once only every thirty years; its frequent shifting
 is transparently inequitable. Make estate-duty high if necessary;
 place it in the hands of the Chancellor as a stable source of
 revenue-of large volume, if you please; but let it not be ex-
 pansible at his annual will.
 The same system as has been advocated for the taxation of
 incomes is immediately and without reservation applicable to
 the taxation of inherited estates.
 Let the unit, as before, be ?100. Then, an estate of ?1,000
 will, as is the case of incomes, pay the whole tax-unit (since
 log. 10 is 1). Then, if we fix 3 per cent. as the tax-unit, an
 estate of ?1,000 will pay ?30. Estates of ?10,000 will be taxed
 at twice that rate (total ?600), and estates of ?100,000 at three
 times the same rate (total ?9,000); estates of ?1,000,000 would
 sacrifice ?120,000; and so on, in each case according to the
 number of estate-units involved.
 The accompanying graph illustrates the rate-incidence which
 would result from this system on the basis of a 3 per cent. tax-
 unit, and compares it with the incidence which obtains at present.
 The curve is, in fact, continuous throughout, as already explained
 in the case of income-tax. It will be noticed that the exemption
 limit is the same as at present. The 3 per cent. tax-unit is
 adopted because it corresponds in its results, more closely than
 any other figure, with the scheme now in force. The comparison
 made in the graph suggests-what to the writer's mind is true-
 that the present arrangement falls with undue severity on the
 higher as compared with the lower sizes of estates. As with the
 income-tax, a table is easily prepared, showing the proportion
 of tax-unit exigible from estates of different sizes, and the total
 amounts which each would pay on the 3 per cent. basis. As in
 the case of incomes, intermediate figures could be calculated, if
 desired, by simple interpolation.
 The method of graduation at present in force is peculiarly
 irritating in the case of estate-duties, where the bare over-
 steppage of any limiting sum involves additional loss of 1 per
 cent. of the whole estate. The result of this, moreover, is loss
 also to the Exchequer; for, as Mr. Money says, "The step is
 so big that people bring themselves just under the step." The
 proposed system entirely eliminates steps, with their evil results.
 D D 2
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 Let me repeat that the logarithmic system is immediately
 and without modification applicable to estate-duties, from the
 top of the scale to the bottom; it would be just in its incidence,
 and satisfactory in its yield; and every Government in power
 would reap the advantages which always flow from a general
 sense of confidence and security.
 DOUGLAS WHITE
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